The Taxi and Limousine Commission of New York City (the “TLC”) has
the authority to issue, revoke, and suspend taxi drivers’ licenses. These tandem
cases require us to examine the TLC’s suspension procedures under the Due
Process Clause to determine whether the TLC provides meaningful hearings to
drivers whose licenses have been suspended pending the outcome of criminal
proceedings. We conclude that it does not.
We first determine that evidence of a driver’s ongoing danger to health
and public safety is relevant under the statutory and regulatory scheme. We then
conclude that, in light of the significant private interest at stake, the unacceptably
high risk of erroneous deprivation, and the fact that additional safeguards can be
provided with minimal burden on governmental resources, the TLC’s refusal to
consider such evidence violates due process.
Accordingly, in Nnebe we AFFIRM in part and REVERSE in part the
judgment of the district court, we AFFIRM in part and REVERSE in part the
judgment in Stallworth, and we REMAND both cases to the district court for
further proceedings.
Thus, by reading the Rule as a whole and consistently with the Ordinance
under whose authority it was promulgated, we conclude that the individual
circumstances underlying a taxi driver’s suspension are relevant to the statutory
scheme and to the role that a due process hearing is designed to play when a
person is threatened with the loss of a valuable property interest.
As noted above, the Ordinance bespeaks a clear
intent to leaven the Commission’s eagerness to discipline drivers with greater
concern for drivers’ rights. Indeed, the City Council embedded its concern into
the text of the Ordinance in the form of a legislative “find[ing] that certain of the
rules promulgated within the past several months by the [TLC], such as those
that modify the disciplinary measures that may be imposed against taxicab and
for-hire vehicle drivers, taxicab and for-hire vehicle owners and taxicab
medallion owners are onerous.” N.Y.C. Code § 19-512.1, n.1 (1999).19 Suspensions
continued due to arrests alone, with no meaningful ability to contest the TLC’s
determination that the licensee poses a threat, would appear to be just the kind of
“onerous” disciplinary measure that the City Council passed § 19-512.1 to
eliminate.
As we have already stated in this case, “the private interest at stake . . . is enormous
¯ most taxi drivers rely on the job as their primary source of income and often
earn the sole income for large families in a city where the cost of living
significantly exceeds the national average.” Nnebe II, 644 F.3d at 159 (internal
quotation marks omitted). Indeed, we have previously held that this factor favors
more extensive process where the interest at stake is “operating a business
and . . . pursuing a particular livelihood.” Spinelli v. City of New York, 579 F.3d
160, 171 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, “[t]he
Supreme Court has ‘repeatedly recognized the severity of depriving someone of
his or her livelihood.’” Id. (quoting FDIC v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 243 (1988)); see
also Brock v. Roadway Exp., Inc., 481 U.S. 252, 263 (1987); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 543 (1985); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970).
Thus, while we take seriously the Government interest implicated, we hold
that, given the potential of conducting far more meaningful hearings at little or
no additional financial or administrative cost to the TLC, that interest is
outweighed by the private interest at stake and the unacceptably high risk of
erroneous deprivation.
In Nnebe II, we reserved the question of “whether a hearing that does
nothing more than confirm the driver’s identity and the existence of a pending
criminal proceeding against him would in fact be adequate process to allow the
City to suspend a driver’s taxi license until the criminal charges are resolved.” Id.
at 161. We now decide that, under the circumstances presented here, given the
high risk of erroneous deprivation of the driver’s livelihood for a period of
months, and under this particular statutory regime that emphasizes the danger of
licensure to the public health and safety, a hearing that in effect conclusively
presumes that suspension is appropriate based solely on the abstract relationship
of the elements of a charged offense to safe driving provides inadequate
process.
As in Krimstock, a taxi-driver’s license can be suspended without any
independent determination of probable cause, and the deprivation could last
weeks or months. And while the TLC Rule does provide a prompt postdeprivation
hearing, as discussed above, that hearing is meaningless.
Here, as in Krimstock, a lengthy deprivation of property, based on an arrest without a judicial
determination of probable cause and without a deeper inquiry into whether the
deprivation is appropriate, violates the Constitution’s guarantee of procedural
due process.
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